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Abstract: This article explores the possibilities of dialogism and monologism for disability 
studies by applying these concepts to a story in which two people orient to boundaries and 
express some concern over being too close or too distant from each other within a research 
encounter. It suggests that questions concerning “how close is too close” to research participants, 
and “how far is too far,” are complex and shift in time as people move between merging and 
unmerging, self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency, and finalizing and unfinalizing practices.  
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In recent years, there has been a small but growing body of literature that has eclectically 
woven concepts and theories from different disciplines in an effort to better understand the lives 
of disabled people (e.g., Bolt, 2006; Couser, 1997; Goodley, 2007). This article is a modest 
attempt to add to the literature by applying the concepts of dialogism and monologism (Bakhtin, 
1981, 1984, 1986) to a story in which myself, and a male (Eamonn) who became disabled 
through playing sport, orient to boundaries and express some concern over being too close or too 
distant from each other within a research encounter. Accordingly, in terms of structure, this 
article first describes the concepts of dialogism and monologism as outlined by Bakhtin. It then 
presents the story in which I and a male orient to boundaries. Following this, through the 
concepts of dialogism and monologism and in relation to the question, “how close is too close to 
research participants, and how far is too far,” analytic attention turns to my interpretations of the 
story. The article closes with some reflections on what dialogism and monologism might mean 
for interdisciplinary disability research. 
 
Dialogism and Monologism 
 
At the risk of riding roughshod over complex concepts, what Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1986) 
calls dialogism and monologism can be elucidated and outlined as follows. In dialogism and 
dialogic speech a person is non-self-sufficient. That is, the person exists in relation to other 
people. Dialogic speech suggests that no matter how personally authentic anyone wants to be or 
wants to allow others to be, and no matter how separate from others we feel we might be, we are 
always connected and socially interdependent. As Bakhtin (1984) put it, “A person’s 
consciousness awakens wrapped in another’s consciousness” (p. 138). In contrast, monologism 
and monologic speech can be characterized by a person seemingly claiming to be self-sufficient. 
Here, the individual suggests that his or her existence is clearly bounded and his or her voice is 
simply his or her own, unaffected or effected by others. Rather than being wrapped up in 
another’s consciousness, the individual is separate from others and can become him or herself. 
 
Furthermore, dialogism and monologism can be described in terms of a person merging, 
or not, with other people. For Bakhtin (1984, 1986), in dialogic speech a person makes a clear 
demand that he or she does not merge with another person. In part this is because, while 
recognizing that he or she is non-self-sufficient, the person also recognizes that he or she is 
different from other people – not apart from each other, but distinct. This view of dialogic speech 
as involving not merging with another is reinforced by Clark and Holquist (1984) in the 
following comment: 
 
“The way in which I create myself is by means of a quest: I go out to the other in order to 
come back with a self. I live into another’s consciousness; I see the world through the 
other’s eyes. But I must never completely meld with that version of things, for the more 
successfully I do, the more I will fall pray to the limits of the other’s horizon. A complete 
fusion…even if it were possible, would preclude the difference required for dialogue” (p. 
78). 
 
Monologic speech, on the other hand, can be characterized as a voice and narrative 
seeking, explicitly or implicitly, to merge with another person. Here, an individual seeks to enter 
the other’s life and fuse his or her own self with the other or assimilate the other to his or her 
own self. As a result, they seemingly abridge difference and the distance between each other. 
 
In addition to the ideas of (non)-self-sufficiency and merging, dialogic speech and 
monologic speech can be described in terms of finalizability and unfinalizability. According to 
Bakhtin (1984), dialogic speech also begins with the recognition of the other’s unfinalizability. 
For him, this is partly because in dialogism the world is not only recognized as a messy place, 
but also as an open place in which one can never know with certainty who the other is or can 
become. Thus, in dialogism and dialogic speech there is a sense of unfinalizability as a person 
avoids giving the final word about the other. In contrast, monologism creates finalizability. That 
is, through monologic speech a person claims the last, the definitive, final word, about who the 
other is and what he or she can become. As Bakhtin describes it, monologic speech is: 
 
“Finalized and deaf to the other’s response…Monologue manages without the other, and 
therefore to some degree materialises all reality. Monologue pretends to be the ultimate 
word. It closes down the represented world and represented persons” (p. 293). 
  
Having briefly offered a description of dialogism and monologism by drawing attention 
to some of their key features, it would be remiss of me not to stress that like most binary 
distinctions, the difference between dialogic and monologic speech is not pure. Indeed, 
ultimately all speech is dialogical inasmuch as all speech contains remembered voices of others 
and orients to other people.
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 Yet, as Frank (2005a) argues, “The difference between monological 
and dialogical speech has practical value for thinking about what kind of people we want to be” 
(p. 293). Seen in this light, monologic and dialogical speech are less an opposition than a 
continuum, but the differences between the extremes of this continuum remain useful and 
significant. 
 
Becoming Disabled Through Playing Sport: Overstepping a Boundary 
 
With all this in mind, I now turn to a story and my interpretations of it. The story can be 
described as small story (Bamberg, 2006; Phoenix & Sparkes, 2009) as it was told during 
interaction outside the narrative environment (Gubrium & Holstein, 2008) of the formal 
interview. It is re-presented, and taped with consent, and is taken from a conversation over coffee 
during a break from an interview with one man (Eamonn) who sustained a spinal cord injury 
through playing sport and is now disabled.  
The conversation took place at Eamonn’s house and was part of a confidential, life 
history interview conducted by myself [Brett Smith]. It was the second interview of a series of 
three that formed part of a wider research project that focused on men’s experiences of suffering 
a spinal cord injury through playing rugby football union. All interviews were tape-recorded, 
transcribed, and subjected to multiple forms of analysis, including a performative analysis. 
  
Eamonn [pseudonym]: I don’t know how you manage to do this research listening to me 
all day. It must be really depressing for you. Is it? 
 
Brett: Sometimes it can be. But often it’s not. Like I said, it’s something I really believe 
in. And anyhow you do make me laugh sometimes. 
 
Eamonn: Yeah, yeah. For the last hour I’ve been talking about how depressed I’ve been 
recently. Hardly a fun afternoon [both laugh]. 
 
Brett: For some maybe, but I do know too just how you feel. I’ve lived with depression, 
been there, at rock bottom, like you. So I know how you feel. I can identify I suppose is 
what I’m trying to say. I know what it feels like to be depressed, and when you talk about 
how you feel, I feel I enter into your world. Anyhow, you’ll, I’m sure you’ll get better. I 
know the future looks bad, but you will get better. You’ll ride this out. You will be fine. 
By yourself you’ll get out the other side. 
 
Eamonn: But maybe I won’t. Maybe I won’t get out of this. It’s not easy when you’re 
disabled, alone, and down in the dumps. It’s not. Nobody knows what the future holds. 
  
Brett: You’re right Eamonn. You’re right; you just don’t know what will happen. And I 
have no idea what it’s like being you. I really have no idea how you feel and am out of 
order telling you things will be fine. They may not be. I don’t know what the future has in 
store for you or me. I suppose I wanted to close the gap between us, know you better, 
empathise, but I’ve overstepped the boundary. I can’t ever know what its like to live in 
your body. 
 
Eamonn: And I can’t ever know what its like to live in yours. At least we’re talking 
though, and I’ve enjoyed it. It’s been good today; it’s been good being with you. And you 
never know, someone might learn from what I’ve said today and over the past year. They 
don’t have to be disabled either. We’re all dependent on each other.  
 
Clearly, there are multiple ways in which the story can be interpreted.
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 As read through the 
concepts of dialogism and monologism, here I interpret it as follows. In the first part, Eamonn 
and I are speaking with each other rather than about each other. In so doing, we are developing 
dialogic speech. As the story develops, however, there is a shift in the story from a dialogical 
voice toward a monological voice. Here, in claiming to know, identify with, and enter into 
Eamonn’s depressed body, I hint at a shared lived-body experience and begin to seemingly 
merge with him, thereby infringing on the mutual difference that sustains the boundary between 
persons: “But I do know too just how you feel. I’ve lived with depression, been there, at rock 
bottom, like you. So I know how you feel. I can identify I suppose is what I’m trying to say. I 
know what it feels like to be depressed, and when you talk about how you feel, I feel I enter into 
your world.”  
 
This monologic speech, in my interpretation, expands further as the story unfolds. Here I 
do not suggest to Eamonn that he might get better, thereby leaving his future open. Instead, I tell 
him he will “get better.” In doing so, I begin to finalize him. Finalization continues when I add, 
“You’ll ride this out. You will be fine.” This monologic voice is then strengthened when I 
suggest that he alone can get himself out of depression: “By yourself you’ll get out the other 
side.” Thus, in my words not only do I finalize Eamonn and persist in maintaining the 
comforting illusion that any of us can, often out of sheer desire to empathize, merge with 
another. But I also continue infringing on the mutual otherness that sustains the boundary 
between us by treating him as self-sufficient. In doing so, I perpetuate monologic speech as well 
as (at least) two preferred narratives within Western cultures. First is the narrative of a bounded 
individual who has the freedom to become him or herself, by him or herself. Second, I perpetuate 
the restitution narrative which tells us that when we are ill we will recover and get better (Frank, 
1995). 
 
But as the story continues, this monologic speech ends as abruptly as it began. “But,” 
Eamonn interrupts, “Maybe I won’t. Maybe I won’t get out of this. It’s not easy when you’re 
disabled, alone, and down in the dumps. It’s not. Nobody knows what the future holds.” In these 
words, as I understand them through Bakhtin, Eamonn disrupts monologism. This is done, in 
part, by problematizing one’s ability to merge with, and offer the final word on, another person. 
He thus signals that I’ve gotten too close and overstepped the boundary between us. As a result, 
Eamonn not only disrupts monologic speech but also sets in motion the potential for dialogic 
speech. 
 
Midway through the story, with Eamonn’s words entering my consciousness, the research 
encounter as a performance is transformed. The performance shifts from being primarily 
monological to being dialogical. Initially this shift occurs as I receive words from Eammon and 
my consciousness becomes wrapped in his consciousness. That is, my voice becomes imbued 
with the voice of Eamonn, but still remains distinguishable. In this voice that is both mine and 
Eamonn’s, I say: “You’re right Eamonn. You’re right; you just don’t know what will happen.” 
Thus in these words, I signal our non-self-sufficiency and move toward an unfinalizing voice and 
speech. My voice and speech never merges with Eamonn, but neither is my voice and speech 
self-sufficient. This dialogical relation is then sustained when I say: “And I have no idea what 
it’s like being you. I really have no idea how you feel and am out of order telling you things will 
be fine. They may not be. I don’t know what the future has in store for you or me. I suppose I 
wanted to close the gap between us, know you better, empathise, but I’ve overstepped the 
boundary.” Early in the sentence, Eamonn and I become unmerged as my concern with getting to 
close to Eamonn is expressed. As the talk unfolds, this dialogical relation continues. In my 
speech I suggest I was caught in a dilemma between getting too close to Eamonn and remaining 
too distant. I felt that I’d overstepped our boundaries rather than getting into the boundary space 
between us that sustains dialogism. This embodied knowledge is reinforced as I utter unfinalizing 
words: “I can’t ever know what it’s like to live in your body.” 
 The dialogical quality of this talk, and the performance of it, is maintained as the story 
unfolds further. This is done by Eamonn, however, as he responds to me: “And I can’t ever know 
what it’s like to live in yours. At least we’re talking though, and I’ve enjoyed it. It’s been good 
today; it’s been good being with you.” Here, again, Eamonn’s voice is non-self-sufficient and 
utters unfinalized words: the openness and “unknowability” of the future. It is too an embodied 
voice that speaks with me rather than about me, and which comes from a space between us rather 
than above. As the story continues, Eamonn becomes a witness (Frank, 1995) inasmuch as he 
assumes a responsibility for telling me what happened: “And you never know, someone might 
learn from what I’ve said today and over the past year. They don’t have to be disabled either. 
We’re all dependent on each other.” This witnessing, therefore, is not a self-sufficient act. It 
implicates another in what Eamonn witnesses, and thus implies a relationship. This is reinforced 
toward the end of the sentence in my reading, as Eamonn questions the monological freedom of 
the individual. In such ways, therefore, we practice a balance between being neither self-
sufficient nor merged, which sustains the boundary between us, and the boundary sustains 
dialogism/dialogic speech.  
 
In sum, the story presented, and my interpretations of it, highlight the shifting dynamics 
of sustaining and crossing boundaries and how this is an on-going process shaped, framed, and 
enabled by dialogical and monological relations. We might therefore consider questions 
concerning “how close is too close” to research participants, and “how far is too far” from them, 
as neither simple nor straightforward. They are complex and shift in time and space as people 
move between merging and unmerging, self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency, and finalizing 
and unfinalizing practices. Accordingly, within disability research people may artfully engage in 
a process of boundary crossing and re-crossing that are, in part, social achievements and 
performances done through dialogical and monological speech (Frank, 2004). 
 
Some Possible Implications for Disability Studies 
 
With the above points in mind, and given the topic of this special forum, what kinds of 
interdisciplinary links does this article make between various fields? In what ways might the 
article further develop an interdisciplinary stance? How might the article develop considerations 
within and across disability studies and the various participatory/oppressive forms of research 
that have proliferated? What possibilities do the concepts of dialogism and monologism offer 
disability studies? 
 
In terms of the kinds of interdisciplinary links between disability studies and various 
other fields, this article has eclectically woven together data generated from a project focusing on 
men’s experiences of becoming disabled through playing sport with theories and concepts from 
such fields as medical sociology, qualitative research, the sociology of the body, and narrative 
psychology. For example, from medical sociology it has shown the reproduction of the 
restitution narrative and, in relation to the sociology of the body, drawn attention to the idea that 
our bodies matter and our experiences of depression are embodied. The article further shows 
recent ideas from narrative psychology, including the extent to which our conversations are 
mediated by powerful cultural narratives (e.g., restitution narrative) that prompt us to say things 
we don’t always believe. It moreover shows in action the idea that researchers in the field of 
narrative should consider using not only big stories from formal interviews, but also those stories 
from outside the formal context of interviewing – that is, the small ones. In addition, the article 
has made disciplinary links between disability studies and the field of qualitative research 
methods inasmuch as both often advocate that to understand others, obtain significant 
knowledge, and do ethically admirable research we should empathize with our participants. The 
article has also signalled this aspiration to empathize in action through a small story. In such 
ways, therefore, the paper moves toward further developing an interdisciplinary stance. 
 
Empathy 
 
In making interdisciplinary links between disability studies and various other fields, 
however, the question needs to be raised, “How does this article develop considerations within 
and across disability studies and the various participatory/oppressive forms of research that have 
proliferated? What possibilities do the concepts of dialogism and monologism offer disability 
studies?” One response is that the article develops critical considerations on the practice of 
empathy and brings to the fore the possibilities dialogism and monologism might have for better 
understanding empathetic relations (see also Mackenzie & Scully, 2007). Within and across 
disability studies and the various participatory/oppressive forms of research in different fields 
that have proliferated, there have been calls for researchers to engage with participants in an 
empathetic manner. A reason given for this is that by empathically imagining the life of the other 
person, a researcher may increase his or her ability to better understand another person’s life, 
engender rapport, reduce emotional harm, and thereby develop research that moves toward 
working with rather than on disabled people. That is to say, the research becomes less oppressive 
and more ethically admirable.  
 
Yet, while empathy can be an important consideration within disability studies and may 
be vital to working with disabled people as part of participatory forms of research, we should not 
forget its limits. The concepts of dialogism and monologism offer us some possibilities on 
understanding these limits. For example, the monologism and dialogism and the story presented 
alert us to the risk that empathy can turn into a form of symbolic violence. One form of violence 
is empathetic projection (Frank, 2004, 2005a). This relates to believing that one can empathically 
imagine being in the others’ shoes and treating him or her as feeling what I feel. But in this 
scenario, as in the story re-presented earlier, empathy can easily turn into projection, or 
sometimes introjection, which is an illusion that one can truly put oneself in the place of, and 
unify or merge with, another person. This symbolic violence of empathetic projection claims that 
you are as I am, and I know how you feel. In projecting oneself onto the other through empathy 
the difference between two people is denied. In denying that difference, one denies the other 
person and empathy tends toward unification, thereby becoming monological. Accordingly, 
without denying that empathy can be useful, the concepts of monologism and dialogism help call 
attention to the limits of empathy so that we might be cognizant of the complexities involved and 
are self-reflexive of how we do empathy within and across disability studies and 
participatory/oppressive forms of research. As Frank (2005a) points out, “Dialogue begins with 
empathy, but sustaining dialogue requires recognition of the limits of empathy” (p. 298).  
 
Finalizing and Unfinalizing Research 
 
Another way the concepts of monologism and dialogism make interdisciplinary links and 
develop considerations within and across disability studies, and offer possibilities for disability 
studies, is by drawing attention to a core ethical demand – that is, not finalizing another person. 
This is a particularly pertinent demand, and can have profound implications, for developing 
various forms of participatory research and avoiding oppressive forms of research. Finalization 
can occur when a researcher claims to have the last word about who another person is and what 
they can become. That is to say, the researcher engages in monological speech. Yet to finalize 
the other person through monological speech is, for Bakhtin (1984), oppressive since it can leave 
that person “hopelessly determined and finished off, as if he [or she] were already quite dead” (p. 
58). For Bakhtin, all that is unethical begins and ends when one human being claims to 
determine all that another is and can be. The authorial word of the researcher becomes the 
person’s fate. 
 
Therefore, as brought to the fore by the concept of monologism and dialogism, it would 
seem important that researchers from across the disciplines aspire to try and avoid monological 
speech, which utters the last word about the person(s). But, of course, that is often easier said 
than done. This is particularly so, given the disturbing observation made by Frank (2004, 2005b). 
As he points out, the claim of groups within and across disciplines to professional status often 
depends crucially on their socially sanctioned capacity to utter monological finalizations: 
  
“Young professionals are taught that in order to be recognised as a professional, and to 
sustain the prestige of the profession in society, they must utter words that claim to be the 
last word, the definitive, finalising word, about those who fall within their purview, 
whether these are patients, students, defendants, clients, or research participants whose 
participation has definite limits. The worst implication of monologue is that those who 
are thus finalised come to expect to be spoken of in this way and…forget to notice the 
falseness of the approach” (Frank, 2005b, p. 967). 
 
Given all this, how might actual interdisciplinary research practice strive to be dialogical 
rather than monological? According to Frank (2004, 2005b) dialogic speech begins with the 
recognition of the other’s unfinalizability. One way that this may be practiced is tied to a key 
question for qualitative research, medical sociology, disability studies, narrative psychology, and 
many other disciplines: “What can one person say about another?” As various researchers from 
different disciplines all propose (Couser, 1997; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Gubrium & Holstein, 
2008; Frank, 2005b; Sparkes, 2002) research is, in the simplest terms, one person’s 
representation of another. In Bakhtin’s dialogical ideal, for researchers working within and 
across disciplines the research report that one represents another’s life must always understand 
itself not as a final statement of who the research participants are, but as one move in a 
continuing dialogue through which those participants will continue to form themselves, as they 
continue to become who they may yet be. The researcher needs to recognize that the participant’s 
future is open and uncertain, and thereby consider representing him or her as such (Frank, 
2005b).  
 
Furthermore, for Frank (2004, 2005b), given that dialogic speech begins with recognition 
of the other’s unfinalizability within a dialogical relation, one person can never say of another, 
“This is who such a person is.” One can say, at most, “This how I see this person now, but I 
cannot know what she or he will become.” Dialogue depends on perpetual openness to the 
other’s capacity to become someone other than whoever she or he already is. Likewise in a 
dialogical relation, any person takes responsibility for the other’s becoming, as well as 
recognising that the other’s voice has entered one’s own, and that as researchers participating 
with disabled people there is the desire and possibility that research instigates change. As Frank 
(2005b) says: 
 
“The dialogical alternative emphasises research participants’ engagement in their own 
struggles of becoming; its focus is stories of struggle, not static themes or lists of 
characteristics that fix participants in identities that fit typologies. Moreover, dialogical 
research requires hearing participants’ stories not as surrogate observations of their lives 
outside the interview but as acts of engagement with researchers. In these acts of 
engagement, the researcher does not passively record where the respondent is in his or 
her life. Any research act is necessarily reactive in its effects: The researcher, by specific 
questions, and even by her or his observing presence, instigates self-reflections that will 
lead the respondent not merely to report his or her life but to change that life…. Research 
does not merely report; it instigates. The ethics are that instigation rest on the premise 
that has been endemic at least to Western thinking since Socrates: The examined life is a 
good thing, not always an immediately happy thing but an unavoidably important thing” 
(p. 968). 
 
Closing Thoughts 
 
Having outlined explicitly how this paper modestly develops an interdisciplinary stance, 
and highlighted some possibilities of dialogism and monologism for disability studies, some 
caveats and limitations need to be acknowledged. Firstly, the story presented here along with the 
points and possibilities raised above are not offered as any model or template of procedures. This 
is because, as Frank (2005b) cautions, it would be monological; such a model or template would 
finalize the researcher and their participants. As such, the story along with the points and 
possibilities raised are offered as guides, providing threads that others may follow and develop if 
they choose. 
 
Secondly, the story presented is a transcribed exchange based wholly on tape-recorded 
interview data. No contextual and interactional factors, like bodily orientation, gesture, space, 
smell, were recorded during the research encounter. As a result, my interpretations of it focus 
wholly on the meaning of the words exchanged, but at the expense of a whole range of 
contextual and interactional factors. As Gubrium and Holstein (2008) put it, “The accent on the 
transcribed texts of stories tends to strip narratives of their social organisation and interactional 
dynamics” (p. xv). Accordingly, it is important that--when possible in future research--we aspire 
to document and take the range of contextual and interactional factors into account. This is 
especially so given that, as Bakhtin (1984) stressed, the particularity of utterance and the 
significance of both linguistic and extralinguistic elements in the production of meaning are vital. 
 
Clearly, then, there is much work to be done in relation to dialogism, monologism, 
narrative, boundaries, extralinguistic elements, disability, and interdisciplinary research. I hope 
this article, as a potential resource, invites others to critically reflect on their relations with others 
within research encounters, how they orientate to boundaries, and the consequences this may 
have on them and others. Whilst not the only or the best way, theories of dialogism and 
monologism can be useful in this process, and may help in our efforts to engage in 
interdisciplinary work.  
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Endnotes 
 
1
A special thanks to Lucy Burke for kindly bringing this to the fore of my attention. 
2
Bakhtin died on the morning of March 7, 1975, from complications of emphysema and was 
attended only by a night nurse, who noted his final words as being, “I go to thee” (Clark & 
Holquist, 1984, p. 343). At a memorial service later that year in Moscow, a number of 
intellectuals gathered to read his works and discuss the impact of his career. Among those 
speaking was Shakespeare scholar L.E. Pinsky, who warned against any single, authoritative 
interpretation of Bakhtin's works (Clark & Holquist, 1984, p. 344). 
 
